Accurate genetic risk prediction is a key goal for medical genetics and great progress has been 14 made toward identifying individuals with extreme risk across several traits and diseases 15 (Collins and Varmus, 2015). However, many of these studies are done in predominantly 16
can be accounted for by variants in Europe that are absent from Africa. We show that this 23 directly leads to poor performance in risk prediction when using variants discovered in 24
Europe to predict risk in African populations, especially in the tails of the risk distribution. To 25 evaluate the impact of this effect in genomic data, we built a Bayesian model to stratify 26 heritability between European-specific and shared variants and applied it to 43 traits and 27 diseases in the UK Biobank. Across these phenotypes, we find ~50% of the heritability comes 28 from European-specific variants, setting an upper bound on the accuracy of genetic risk 29 prediction in non-European populations using effect sizes discovered in European 30
populations. We conclude that genetic association studies need to include more diverse 31 populations to enable to utility of genetic risk prediction in all populations. 32 33
The past decade of genome wide association studies (GWAS) has uncovered a plethora of trait 34 associated loci scattered across the genome (The Wellcome Trust Case Control Consortium,  35 2007; The UK10K Consortium, 2015; Visscher et al., 2017; Bycroft et al., 2018) . Geneticists have 36 devoted many resources to turning these associations into risk prediction models that can be 37 used to guide healthcare decisions for a variety of traits and diseases (Vilhjálmsson et al., 2015) . 38 Recent work has suggested these risk scores may be ready for clinical use (Khera et al., 2018, 39 2019). While individuals with high genetic risk for diseases have been found using these scores 40
(for example atherosclerosis (Natarajan et al., 2017) and breast cancer (Maas et al., 2016)), 41 challenges remain in applying these risk scores uniformly across populations. Recent analyses 42 have suggested that because many of the largest studies are concentrated on European 43 populations, risk scores may be biased and less informative in non-European populations 44 (Scutari et Here we propose that an additional reason for the lack of transferability of risk scores is 54 that each population has its own genetic architecture, owing to the evolutionary processes that 55
give rise to traits. Under this reasoning, a population's demographic history influences the 56 number of causal variants and their frequencies, resulting in some phenotypic variance coming 57 from causal variants that are population-specific. For example, work on the genetic architecture 58 of skin color in African populations has uncovered distinct loci affecting the trait in each 59
population, suggesting that populations with independent demographic histories can end up 60 with different genetic architectures and causal variants for the same traits (Martin et al., 61 2017b). Indeed, modeling work suggests that genetic architecture is an outcome of the 62 evolutionary process rather than a trait-specific property (Lohmueller, 2014 Depending on the interplay between allele frequency and effect size, these variants could make 72 up a large portion of the heritability for many traits, as demonstrated by a recent GWAS on 73 height and BMI using whole genome sequencing data (Wainschtein et al., 2019) . Because 74 heritability is the proportion of variance explained by additive factors, it is directly related to 75 the accuracy of phenotypic prediction as the variance explained by the genetic risk score (de los  76 Campos et al., 2010). If these private variants do contribute to heritability, it follows that the 77 variants will not be useful for risk prediction between populations because they are not present 78 in other populations. The proportion of heritability that private variants explain places an upper 79 bound on the accuracy of risk scores between populations. 80
In this study, we use simulations under demographic scenarios of recent population 81 growth with varying amounts of negative selection as well as analyses of empirical data to test 82 the role of private variants in complex traits. 83 We begin by conducting simulations under models of human evolution, where an 84 ancestral population split into a group that underwent a genetic bottleneck out of Africa 85 (representing a European population) and a group that stayed within Africa without a 86 bottleneck (representing an African population; Fig 1a; (Gravel et al., 2011)), coupled with 87 varying levels of negative selection on traits (including no negative selection). We include 88 negative selection by modifying the relationship between a mutation's effect on the trait and 89 its effect on reproductive fitness using the model put forth by Eyre-Walker in 2010 (see 90
Methods). This model includes a parameter, , which ties the selection coefficient of a mutation 91 to its effect on a trait (see Methods; (Eyre-Walker, 2010)). Larger values of imply that more 92 evolutionarily deleterious mutations have larger effects on the trait. We define private variants 93
as those that occur in Europe and are absent from Africa and shared variants as those that 94 occur in both populations. Note that by our definition, private variants may be shared between 95
other Out-of-Africa populations due to shared recent history. Importantly, our model includes 96 exponential growth in the out-of-Africa population, which creates an excess of private variants, 97 as well as low levels of migration between the European and African populations, which can 98 turn some private variants into shared variants. These simulations predict 11.98% of variants at 99 a frequency greater than 5% in Europe will be private to Europe, suggesting that private 100 variants need not have very low allele frequencies (Fig 1b) . In the Exome Aggregation 101 consortium (ExAC) dataset, we find that 11.69% of variants above 5% frequency in the non-102
Finnish European sample are private to Europe (see Supplementary note S3.3), suggesting the 103 model predicts the amount of private variation accurately. In addition, the simulations predict 104 there to be more causal variants ( | | ≥ 1×10 )* ; Fig 1c; Methods) in Europe than in Africa, 105 consistent with exponential growth resulting in many more variants in Europe. 106 We reasoned that since there are many private causal variants in our simulations, they 107 may account for a substantial proportion of the heritability in aggregate. We examined the 108 contribution of private variants to heritability and found that when traits are not tied to fitness 109 ( = 0), private variants account for ~30% of the heritability ( Fig. 2a ). However, when the 110 coupling between trait effects and fitness effects is moderate ( = 0.25) or strong ( = 0.5), 111 private variants account for over half of the heritability, with a maximum of ~79% under strong 112 coupling ( Fig. 2b,c) . These results suggest that many causal variants, which jointly explain much 113 of the heritability, tend to be population specific and this is a consequence of how the trait 114
relates to fitness as well as the demographic history of the population. 115
The fact that many of the variants that affect the trait are not shared across populations 116 may limit the applicability of polygenic risk scores (PRS) derived from European populations to 117 other populations. This effect would be distinct from imperfect tagging of causal variants due to 118 differences in LD patterns between populations. To test for this effect in simulated data, we 119 calculated true genetic risk scores for individuals in the simulated European and African 120
populations and asked how well risk scores derived from only private variants and only shared 121 variants correlated with the true risk scores. Risk scores derived from only shared variants 122
represent the case where a polygenic risk score can be transferred from Europe to another 123 population. If risk scores from shared variants correlate well with the true risk scores, genetic 124 risk scores may still be accurate across populations. We note that these simulations include 125
identification of the true causal SNPs and, as such, are much higher than PRS accuracies 126 reported elsewhere (Martin et al., 2019) . These simulations represent the best case scenario for 127 risk scores. We found that when traits are not tied to fitness, the shared PRS has a 91% 128 correlation in Europe and 96% correlation in Africa with the true PRS, suggesting that genetic 129 risk scores can be applied between populations (Fig 3a) . However, we found that when 130 negative selection increases, the correlation between shared risk scores and the true genetic 131 risk decreases (Fig 3bc) and the correlation between private risk scores and true genetic risk 132 increases (Fig 3def) . For traits with strong coupling between trait effects and fitness effects 133 ( =0.5), the correlation between the true risk scores and the risk scores derived from shared 134 variants drops to 62% in Europe and 57% in Africa ( Supplementary table S3 ). These findings 135
suggest that genetic risk scores based solely on shared variants may be substantially less 136 accurate than genetic risk scores using all variants and may not transfer between populations 137 well when traits are under negative selection. 138
While shared variants do not capture the full distribution of genetic risk for traits under 139 negative selection, we asked whether individuals in the tail of the true risk distribution 140 remained in the tail when examining shared variants only. When there is no coupling between 141 fitness and trait effects ( =0), we find that shared variants capture 35% of the tail correctly in 142
Europe and 28% of the tail correctly in Africa (Table 1) limited in accuracy and many population specific causal variants remain to be discovered. 201
In this work, we have shown that recent population growth and negative selection 202 create population-specific genetic architectures for phenotypes, which has the direct effect of 203 reducing the accuracy of genetic risk scores when applied between populations. The reduction 204 in accuracy will depend on how differentiated populations are, with accuracy decreasing as 205 populations before more differentiated. Another case to consider is admixed populations 206
where some causal variants could be introduced and thus become shared variants. In these 207 cases, we expect the utility of genetic risk scores to be higher, but this will depend on how 208 recent the admixture was and how many causal variants are transferred between populations, 209 which can vary between individuals. 210
We also highlight a crucial issue in identifying individuals in the tails of the risk 211 distribution. If genetic risk scores are to be used more commonly, false negative rates must be 212 more closely examined across populations and phenotypes. Our work suggests that many 213 causal variants may not be shared between populations, indicating that variants ascertained in 214
European populations may not be informative in other populations. This could occur because 215 on average, more European specific variants have been either directly included in GWAS or 216 imputed more often than variants specific to other non-European populations. To ensure equal 217 where ∈ {−1, 1} with equal probability, ~(0, 0.5), and is the selection coefficient of a 237 variant segregating in the population at the end of the simulation. is a scaling factor for effect 238 sizes and controls the heritability for a given mutational target size. In these simulations, was 239 set to obtain a heritability of ~0.4 (see Supplemental table S4 ). Finally, reflects the 240 relationship between a SNP's effects on fitness and the trait. = 0 indicates no relationship 241 between fitness and the trait, while > 0 suggests that negative selection acts on the trait, 242
with larger values indicating stronger negative selection. We call variants private and shared 243
based on their allele frequency in a sample of 10,000 chromosomes from both populations (see 244 below). 245 246
Risk Score Calculation 247
We compute 3 sets of risk scores: 1) using all variants 2) using variants private to the simulated 248
European population 3) using variants shared between the simulated European and African 249 populations. For each haploid genome, we sum the effect sizes for each class of variants, 250 resulting in 3 scores for each genome. We standardize the scores by subtracting the mean of 251 the true genetic risk (class 1) and dividing by the standard deviation of the true genetic risk 252 (class 1). We compute the Pearson correlation between classes 1 and 2 as well as 1 and 3. 253 254
Model to identify private variants 255
When analyzing the empirical UK Biobank data, it is challenging to assess whether a particular 256 variant is private or shared. If a variant is seen only in one population, it is possible that it is 257 truly private to that population, or instead, it is shared, but at too low a frequency to have been 258 discovered with the number of individuals samples from that other population. To address this 259 issue, we built a probabilistic model to evaluate the probability that a variant is private to a 260 population given the number of copies of the allele in that population (that is, the allele 261 frequency). Given a collection of variants, we wish to compute this probability for each variant 262
:
where is 1 if the variant is private to a population and 0 if it is shared. The quantity 266 ( ) is the probability of an allele having i copies in the population and can be 267 computed from the site frequency spectrum. The quantity ) represents the 268 probability of a variant having i copies in the population, given that it is private and can be 269 computed from the site frequency spectrum of private variants rather than the spectrum of all 270 variants. While these two quantities can be computed analytically (see Wakeley and Hey, 1997; 271 Wakeley, 2008), here we are concerned with non-equilibrium demographies and a non-neutral 272 distribution of fitness effects. Thus, we instead obtain these quantities from forward 273 simulations. Using the simulation framework described in Supplementary note section S3.1, we 274 compute the SFS for private variants (giving us )), the SFS for all variants 275 (giving us ( )), and the overall probability that a variant is private (giving us 276 ( )). Importantly, these simulations do not make any assumptions about the 277 relationship between a mutation's effect on the trait and its effect on fitness (i.e. ). Rather, we 278 only use the simulations to quantify how the demography and purifying selection (irrespective 279 of the trait) will affect the SFS. 280 281
Model evaluation 282
We evaluated the ability of our model to distinguish between private and shared 283 variants by simulating new data and performing binary classification, calling a variant private if 284 the ) exceeded some threshold . We varied this threshold and computed 285 the number of true positive (private variants that are truly private), false positives (private 286 variants that are truly shared), false negatives (shared variants that are truly private), and true 287 negatives (shared variants that are truly shared). We summarized this using receiver operator 288 characteristic and precision recall curves (Supplementary note S3.2; Supplementary figure S1; 289
Supplementary tables S1, S2). 290 We also validated our model using data from the Exome Aggregation Consortium (Lek et  291 al., 2016). For each variant in ExAC, we used our model to compute the probability that the 292 variant is private to the Non-Finnish European population based on the allele frequency in that 293 population. Then, we checked whether variants were observed in a sample of 10,406 African 294
and African-American samples (Supplementary note section S3.3). 295 296
Partitioning W 297
We applied our model to GWAS summary statistics from 43 traits in the UK Biobank 298 released by the Neale lab (see URLs). We used our model to compute the probability that each 299 variant is private. We computed the additive genetic variance for variants with a high posterior 300
probability of being private to the British cohort and divided that by the total amount of 301 additive genetic variance explained by SNPs (Supplementary note section S4). We also 302 performed the inference using a randomized algorithm to correct for the effects of linkage 303 disequilibrium and misestimated effect sizes as well as population stratification (Supplementary 304 note section S2, S4; Supplementary figs S2, S3, S4, S5, S6, S7, S8). Finally, we also independently 305 replicated the results on BMI using data from the GIANT consortium (Supplementary note  306 section S4). 307 308
Correcting for falsely inferred private variants 309
The proportion of heritability from private variants depends on the threshold used to classify 310 variants as private or not. In Figure 4 , we use a threshold that corresponds to an estimated false 311 discovery rate (FDR) of ~5% from simulations and ~14% from empirical data (Supplementary 312 note S3). We also conservatively estimate the proportion of the heritability attributable to 313 private variants accounting for these falsely inferred private SNPs (Figure 4) . To do this, we 314 sorted the private SNPs in decreasing order of the amount of variance that the explained and 315
removed the top 5% of these SNPs (i.e. we removed the 5% of the private SNPs that explained 316 the most heritability). We also repeated this procedure removing 14% of the SNPs. fitness and its effect on the trait ( = 0) b,e) moderate coupling between fitness and trait 491 effects ( = 0.25) c, f) strong coupling ( = 0.5). As the strength of coupling increases, risk 492 scores computed from shared variation become less correlated with the true genetic risk score. 493
However, at the same time, risk scores computed from private variation become more 494 correlated with the true genetic risk scores. 495
